






Abstract- A growing challenge in the restructuring of the 
electrical sector, where competition is introduced in the 
generation area, is to achieve equivalent efficiencies in the 
electrical distribution service, an activity that develops in a 
monopolistic environment. Chile has had an experience of 
over 20 years of applying benchmark price regulation to its 
distribution companies. This summary discusses the 






Electrical distribution companies, being network 
industries, aim to the transport and distribution of electric 
power from specific points in high or medium voltage lines to 
end consumers at appropriate voltage levels for industrial and 
residential usage. This activity is organized in public service 
utilities that obtain power supply through contracts with 
generators. 
During the last two decades, many countries and 
geographical areas of the world have made drastic 
transformations in their electrical sectors, both in terms of 
segmentation and privatization of state monopolies. Because of 
these transformations, a big change in the role of the State has 
been witnessed. The State has transformed itself from a 
producer and enterprise-owner agent into an agent that 
regulates those stages of the electrical sector that become 
natural monopolies, such as electrical distribution. The 
challenge is to stimulate an efficient service in distribution, 
similar to that that would be achieved in a competitive 
environment [5]. 
To regulate electrical distribution, most Latin-American 
countries that have started this transformation have adopted a 
“benchmark” scheme, using the concept of an efficient 
company that is a company that is adapted to demand and that 
operates under an optimal investment and operations plan. 
Under this scheme, to force companies to be efficient, the 
regulator fixes prices according to the costs of an efficient 
company, designed from square one and without considering 
actual companies. The actual company will get a normal 
profitability only if it is capable of emulating the efficient 
company, reducing its operating and investment expenditure, 
thus minimizing the present value of its costs. In general, this 
regulation has implied a reduction trend in distribution tariffs. 
This paper assesses the 20 year experience of Chile in 
applying benchmark price regulation to its distribution 
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companies. It discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Chilean benchmark scheme. 
  
II. THE DISTRIBUTION ACTIVITY  
 
 The distribution activity is characterized by the 
constant investments to be made to render good services and to 
achieve the various scale economies that can be attained by 
companies when developing their facilities and their 
management and operation. Although economies of scale add 
up efficiency, they also make the revenues generated through a 
marginal cost tariff not to be enough to cover these companies’ 
total costs. Likewise, the strong inter-dependence of investments 
and the long capital-recovery period give origin to a costs 
function that is clearly under-additive for the relevant demand 
range. This takes to conclude that it is more socially efficient to 
have a single company instead of several companies operating 
in a same geographical area. In this manner, and as it is a matter 
of guaranteeing maximum coverage, with the highest quality 
and least price possible, single distribution companies are 
justified and they are allowed to operate as a natural monopoly. 
 Within this framework, since there is no market 
competition, the primary goal of any regulatory scheme is to 
provide the appropriate incentives to companies to force them to 
be efficient and through an adequate price signal, to make them 
to be able to transfer, in the long term, part of their benefits to 
the users given their efficient investment and operating policies 
[4]. Based on these principles, the regulation of natural 
monopolies is made through different approaches [1, 2]. 
 Regarding costs associated to the activity that is 
intended to be remunerated, they are associated to the network 
exploitation, maintenance and expansion components. They can 
be grouped into the items indicated in Fig. 1. 
 
III. DISTRIBUTION REGULATION CHALLENGES  
 
The tariff regulation is a very complex and demanding 
process, considering: 
•The need to adequately identify and value the different 
components  
•The need to fairly and transparently weight the 
influence of factors such as network type – rural or urban – 
overhead or underground lines, and the type and density of 
consumption present in the company’s activity 
•The convenience of emitting signals to encourage the 
adoption of more efficient behaviors by the companies 
performing in the concession areas 
These challenges have been treated differently in 
regulations, some using rate of return and price cap methods, or 
in the case of Chile, and other countries in South and Central 
America, adopted a “benchmark” scheme, using the concept of 
comparison with an efficient company. All methods serve the 
same final objective, but the context in which they were created 
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where different, making them more suitable than others 
depending on the general environment of the country. In the 
case of Chile, benchmark methodologies were appropriated 
twenty years ago when Chile was a fast developing country, and 
still is, with high needs of investment across all economic 
sectors, which demanded high investment rates in energy 
markets. Benchmark methodology provided clear signals of 
investment and stability for recently privatized utilities, and 
forced for efficiency. 
In Chile, where the next tariff process is due to 
commence in early 2008, a reform to the distribution regulatory 
model is currently been discussed, the Government assessing 





Figure 1.- Cost components of the distribution activity 
 
 
IV. THE BENCHMARK IN ACTION 
 
There have been 20 years of experience in Chile in 
applying benchmark price regulation to its distribution 
companies. As Fig. 2 illustrates for the low voltage segment of 
the largest Chilean distribution company, the remuneration of 
the distribution business has followed a downward pattern, with 
an overall reduction of 44% since 1984. 
 
 Figure 2.- Costs recognized for low voltage distribution 
 
Nonetheless the cost reductions, returns for the 
distribution companies have been very favorable concentrating 
between 10 % and 20%, as can be seen in Figure 3. This solely 
fact is what leads to question if fairness has been achieved and if 
there has been or not an adequate transfer of benefits to the final 
consumers, given the distribution companies efficient 
investment and operating policies.  
 



























































It is clear that distribution companies have been able to 
gain efficiency through out the time, reflecting the clear 
incentives of the benchmark methodology. Reductions of 
technical and non technical losses are shown in Fig. 4. 
Reduction of losses has been achieved over time, reducing them 
more than 50 % in less than ten years. 
 
V. THE BENCHMARK CHALLENGES 
 
The benchmark process has faced different difficulties 
over the years, with conflicts arising over interpretation between 
the regulator and the companies involved. While the regulator 
aims at reducing tariffs as much as possible, the companies aim 




The use of an efficient model company requires 
designing a distribution company from square one, in 
which it is possible to evaluate different technological 
alternatives that not necessarily are in use by the 
concessionary company, leaving aside the historical 
practices. In this sense, the evaluation of conductor 
technologies is a matter of permanent discussion, for 
example, the use of copper versus aluminum, the 
determination of distribution voltage, the range for 
optimal use of the conductors and the compared length 
of networks of low and high voltage. The studies show 
that the model company installs practically the same 
amount of network of low voltage, but with a greater 
transport capacity, mainly correlated with the street 
layout, and installs a high voltage network of smaller 
length, conditioned by the optimization of the secondary 
transformers.  
In relation to secondary transformers, the total 
installations are evaluated, considering both location and 
capacity. The studies show that the model company 
installs a smaller number of transformers of greater 
capacity and better located, which nevertheless results in 
a greater total installed capacity with a lower cost than 
the concessionary company, essentially due to 
economies of scale. 
 
b) Management 
Certainly an area that causes conflict in the building of 
the model company bears relation to the design of the 
organization and infrastructure necessary to administer, 
operate and maintain the distribution network of the 
company. Aspects such as organization design and the 
number of workers, level of outsourcing of functions, 
such as maintenance or commercial areas, are 
permanently discussed and subject to different views 
between the regulator and the distribution companies. 
 
c) Economies of scale and prices 
With the objective to determine the value of the efficient 
model company, it is necessary to have studies of 
market prices of the necessary items for the installation 
and operation of the distribution network, as well as 
studies of wages for the employees of the model 
company. There is a permanent discussion on different 
issues, such as the concept of market price, given the 
difficulty to obtain price references of specific 
equipment, which often forces to use actual information 
from the company, and the level of wages adapted for 
the distribution company, which is generally obtained 
from a survey of prices and benchmark with other 
companies.  
Another subject of discussion the price to consider for 
commodities at the time of the study, such as steel, 
copper and aluminum, the discussion arising  in relation 
to the model being valued at a cost that does not 
correspond to the one historically incurred by the 
monopoly. Possibly, it can mean a sub valuation of the 
company, if the commodities at the time of the fixation 
correspond to historical lower of prices, or viceversa. 
 
d) Municipal rights 
Municipal rights have to be paid for the construction of 
new infrastructure when public roads are used, rights 
which are related to the ground occupation for the 
construction. Although these rights have not necessarily 
been paid historically by the companies, they are costs 
that any new entrant must assume. For this reason, these 
costs are recognized in the model company, principle 
that is consequent with the objective to simulate the 
competition produced by a new entrant. This is an 
important difference with other models of tarification, 
like rate of return or price cap regulations, and has been 
very controversial in past processes. 
 
In general, the benchmark process needs to follow 
general guidelines that may also be difficult to achieve. 
For example, it is very important to assure regulator 
independency from monopoly pressure, and avoid regulator 
capture. This is a key issue in any of the schemes that have been 
formulated to tariff the distribution segment. The benchmark 
model exacerbates conflictive interests between regulator and 
monopoly. On another hand there is always the risk that the 
regulator could manipulate the model company with other 
objectives, such as political interests to lower rates.  
Also it is very important to consider reliability and 
quality of supply, especially since the model company has to 
necessarily comply with current reliability and quality 
regulations, same as the existing distribution companies. 
Therefore, there has to be a consistency between the standards 
of quality and reliability that are required and the level of 
income set by the resultant tariff. 
Currently there are other concerns related with the 
procedures for the tariff fixation in Chile. For example, the law 
requires that when the model company is to be calculated, two 
independent studies must be done, one by the distribution 
company and a second one done by the National Energy 
Commission. The results of these two studies must be averaged 
considering a weight of two thirds for the government and one 
third for the distribution company. This mechanism obviously 
has the perverse incentive to raise the values of the study in one 
hand and in the other to reduce it to minimum, leading to a 
speculative game. Alternatives mechanisms are currently being 
revised to replace it. 
 Certainly another limitation that is present in the 
process are the asymmetries of information in the knowledge of 
the consumer needs and the consumer load characteristics. In 







the distribution companies have anything, there is nothing that 




The Chilean experience with a benchmark scheme to 
determine distribution rates, using the particular concept of an 
efficient company that is adapted to demand and that operates 
under an optimal investment and operations plan, has resulted in 
a sustained evidence of efficiency, though clear incentives for 
cost reductions, and attraction to investors, given adequate 
returns to investment capital. 
Nonetheless, greater fairness in efficiency sharing is an 
objective that although it is partially achieved, should be revised, 
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